Contract Theory

Patrick Bolton, Mathias Dewatripont

724 pages, parution le 26/01/2005

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Résumé

Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.

The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.

L'auteur - Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of The Journal of the European Economic Association.

L'auteur - Mathias Dewatripont

Mathias Dewatripont is Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a Research Fellow at its European Centre for Adanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) and Research Director of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).

Sommaire

Static Bilateral Contracting
- Hidden Information, Screening
- Hidden Information, Signaling
- Hidden Action, Moral Hazard
- Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information
- Multidimensional Incentive Problems
Static Multilateral Contracting
- Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions
- Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion
Repeated Bilateral Contracting
- Dynamic Adverse Selection
- Dynamic Moral Hazard
Incomplete Contracts
- Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design
- Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information
- Markets and Contracts
Appendix
- Exercises
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index

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Caractéristiques techniques

	PAPIER
Éditeur(s)	The MIT Press
Auteur(s)	Patrick Bolton, Mathias Dewatripont
Parution	26/01/2005
Nb. de pages	724
Format	18,5 x 23,5
Couverture	Relié
Poids	1126g
Intérieur	Noir et Blanc
EAN13	9780262025768
ISBN13	978-0-262-02576-8