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The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
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The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions

The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions

William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, William Roberts Clark

218 pages, parution le 16/10/2003

Résumé

Recent analysis by political economists of monetary institution determinants in different countries has been limited by the fact that exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions are studied in isolation from each other, without examining how one institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and level of central bank independence together; the articles (originally published in a special issue of International Organization) constitute a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The contributors consider both economic and political factors to explain a country's choice of monetary institutions, and examine the effect of political processes in democracies, including interest group pressure, on the balance between economic and distributional policy.

Contents

  • The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
  • by William J. Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark
  • Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital by William Roberts Clark
  • Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments by Philip Keefer and David Stasavage
  • Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions by Mark Hallerberg
  • Political Parties and Monetary Commitments by William Bernhard and David Leblang
  • Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration by Jeffrey A. Freiden
  • Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes by J. Lawrence Broz
  • Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions by John R. Freeman

L'auteur - William Bernhard

is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

L'auteur - J. Lawrence Broz

is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

L'auteur - William Roberts Clark

is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.

Caractéristiques techniques

  PAPIER
Éditeur(s) The MIT Press
Auteur(s) William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, William Roberts Clark
Parution 16/10/2003
Nb. de pages 218
Format 15 x 22,5
Couverture Broché
Poids 325g
Intérieur Noir et Blanc
EAN13 9780262524148
ISBN13 978-0-262-52414-8

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