Economics and the theory of games

Fernando Vega-Redondo

524 pages, parution le 21/10/2003

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Résumé

This textbook offers a systematic, self-contained account of the main contributions of modern game theory and its applications to economics. Starting with a detailed description of how to model strategic situations, the discussion proceeds by studying basic solution concepts, their main refinements, games played under incomplete information, and repeated games. For each of these theoretical developments, there is a companion set of applications that cover the most representative instances of game-theoretic analysis in economics, e.g. oligopolistic competition, public goods, coordination failures, bargaining, insurance markets, implementation theory, signaling and auctions.

The theory and applications covered in the first part of the book fall under the so-called 'classical' approach to game theory, which is founded on the paradigm of players' unlimited rationality. The second part shifts towards topics that no longer abide by that paradigm. This leads to the study of topics such as the interplay between evolution and rationality.

Theoretical Framework
Strategic-Form Analysis: Theory
Strategic-Form Analysis:Applications
Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: Theory
Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: Applications
Incomplete Information: Theory
Incomplete Information: Applications
Repeated Interaction: Theory
Repeated Interaction: Applications
Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium
Learning to Play
Social Learning and Equilibrium Selection
Bibliography
Index

Caractéristiques techniques

	PAPIER
Éditeur(s)	Cambridge University Press
Auteur(s)	Fernando Vega-Redondo
Parution	21/10/2003
Nb. de pages	524
Format	17,7 x 25,5
Couverture	Broché
Poids	910g
Intérieur	Noir et Blanc
EAN13	9780521775908
ISBN13	978-0-521-77590-8