Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

Alan D. Taylor

176 pages, parution le 22/06/2005

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Résumé

Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.

This is the only book that tries to bring together the main results from the last quarter of the twentieth century that deal with the manipulability of voting systems
This is a unified treatment; a vast majority of the proofs are new
This is a self-contained treatment; there are no prerequisites except a willingness to follow mathematical arguments

L'auteur - Alan D. Taylor

Alan D. Taylor : Union College, New York

Sommaire

Introduction
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Additional results for single-valued elections
The Duggan-Schwartz theorem
Additional results for multi-valued elections
Ballots that rank sets
Elections with outcomes that are lotteries
Elections with variable agendas

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Caractéristiques techniques

	PAPIER
Éditeur(s)	Cambridge University Press
Auteur(s)	Alan D. Taylor
Parution	22/06/2005
Nb. de pages	176
Format	15 x 22,5
Couverture	Broché
Poids	270g
Intérieur	Noir et Blanc
EAN13	9780521008839
ISBN13	978-0-521-00883-9